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Public debt is one of the important economic variables that quantitatively describes a nation’s
economy. Because bankruptcy is a risk faced even by institutions as large as governments (e.g.
Iceland), national debt should be strictly controlled with respect to national wealth. Also, the
problem of eliminating extreme poverty in the world is closely connected to the study of extremely
poor debtor nations. We analyze the time evolution of national public debt and find “convergence”:
initially less-indebted countries increase their debt more quickly than initially more-indebted coun-
tries. We also analyze the public debt-to-GDP ratio R, a proxy for default risk, and approximate
the probability density function P (R) with a Gamma distribution, which can be used to establish
thresholds for sustainable debt. We also observe “convergence” in R: countries with initially small
R increase their R more quickly than countries with initially large R. The scaling relationships
for debt and R have practical applications, e.g. the Maastricht Treaty requires members of the
European Monetary Union to maintain R < 0.6.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Da, 89.90.+n
I. INTRODUCTION
Just as an individual is expected to control his/her
debt to asset ratio, so is a government expected to control
its national debt as a function of the country’s wealth,
measured e.g. by its gross domestic product (GDP). In
a dynamic global economy, excessive borrowing cannot
persist indefinitely, as creditors are bound to call in large
loans. While a country suffers financial problems when
its GDP does not increase fast enough, even more seri-
ous trouble begins when its debt increases faster than its
GDP. While national GDP has been the topic of many
studies on economic growth [1–4], the empirical analysis
of public debt has lagged due to lack of comprehensive
data.
Large sets of public debt data, dating back several
decades, and ranging from poor to rich countries, have
recently become available. Here we use concepts of statis-
tical physics to analyze public debt data for a wide cross-
section of economies including underdeveloped, develop-
ing, and developed countries. The total public debt data,
along with total GDP data, are available at the Inter-
American Development Bank [5], and are compiled and
analyzed in Refs. [6, 7]. Population data are available
by the World Bank, and can be reconstructed through
GDP and per capita GDP data compiled in Ref. [8]. We
deflate all USD amounts to in units of the USD in the
year 2000 [9]. In our analysis, we compare public debt
only within the same country, in order to avoid any dif-
ferences in the theoretical and practical definition of debt
and the reporting of debt by various countries, an issue
pointed out in Refs. [6, 7, 10]. Our results are robust
with respect to mis-reporting and ambiguous definitions
of public debt [10]. In Fig. 1 we plot the debt-to-GDP
ratio R for many countries, grouped in panels (a-d) by
common historical, geographical, and financial factors.
In Fig. 1(d) we plot the average debt-to-GDP ratio for
three subgroups corresponding to World Bank Income
Group (IG) classifications, and observe relatively high
levels of R among the poorest countries.
Economic growth theories predict that GDP should
“converge” towards equality, with wealthy countries ex-
periencing smaller relative growth rates than poor coun-
tries. However, the opposite has been found for economic
wealth data [11–13]. So we address the question, what
are the growth dynamics for public debt? To answer this
question, we analyze a comprehensive database of na-
tional public debt and GDP to investigate the dynamics
of debt growth and growth in R.
With the current global credit crunch, and several no-
table recent national defaults, it is important to address
sustainable public debt, defined as the amount of debt
where the receiving country is capable of meeting its
current and future debt obligations [14, 15]. The total
current government debt D(t) increases from last year’s
debt D(t − 1) partially due to interest payments on the
debt D(t−1) at interest rate ID(t), and partially because
of the current primary deficit, defined as the difference
between spending S(t+1) and taxes T (t+1) [16]. Thus
D(t) = [1 + ID(t− 1)]D(t− 1) + [S(t)− T (t)] . (1)
We consider three possible scenarios for public debt
growth dynamics:
(i) Growth rates of the country debt do not depend on
the initial debt level.
(ii) A more indebted country has a larger debt growth
rate than a less indebted country, so that relative
differences between debt across countries increases
over time (divergence).
2(iii) A more indebted country has a smaller debt growth
rate than a less indebted country, so that relative
differences between debt across countries decreases
over time (convergence).
These three scenarios have different implications for in-
vestors, who will only accept government debt up to some
ceiling. Hence, one would expect that more indebted
countries would increase their debt more slowly than less
indebted countries.
II. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
To ascertain which of the three debt scenarios is better
supported by empirical facts, we define for country i the
annualized logarithmic growth rate of per capita initial
debt di(t) between years t and t+∆t
ri(t, t+∆t) ≡
log[di(t+∆t)/di(t)]
∆t
. (2)
We compare ri(t, t+∆t) to di(t), assuming ri(t, t+∆t)
depends on debt size by
ri(t, t+∆t) ∼= α− β log[di(t)] . (3)
The functional form of Eq. (3) can also be expressed as
log[di(t+∆t)] = α ∆t+ (1− β∆t) log[di(t)] (4)
If β > 0, there is convergence in per capita debt data
across countries, since initially more indebted economies
tend to increase their debt slower (smaller ri(t, t + ∆t))
than initially less indebted economies. Hence, β repre-
sents the “speed of convergence”, a concept introduced
for per capita GDP data in Ref. [13]. A larger posi-
tive value of β results in faster convergence, equalizing
the per capita debt across all countries more quickly. If
β < 0 there is divergence in debt data, where initially
less-indebted countries with smaller di(t) increase their
debt slower than initially more-indebted countries.
In Fig. 2 we plot the 1990 per capita debt of more
than 80 countries, representing low-, medium-, and high-
wealth countries, considering several relationships. First,
we compare the per capita debt over (a) 15-year and (d)
7-year time horizons. We find the slope S = (1−β∆t) of
the regression in Eq. (4) is less than one, requiring β > 0
which corresponds to scenario (iii).
To confirm the convergence across countries for other
time horizons, Fig. 3 shows the value of S for varying
initial d(t) and time horizon ∆t in Eq.(4). We find S ≡
1−β∆t < 1 for most horizons ∆t, implying convergence,
where less-indebted countries increase their debt faster
than more-indebted countries. However, there is a period
in the beginning of the 1990’s that is the exception, with
S > 1 and β < 0. This period of divergence in per capita
debt may be related to the 20-year lows in interest rates
which may have resulted in increased borrowing, even
among heavily indebted countries. Since 1995, the values
of S have returned to values less than one, indicating a
return to convergence.
We also analyze the growth rates of per capita GDP
and confirm the divergence across countries observed
originally in [11–13]. In Fig. 4 we plot for per capita
GDP, the analogous regression S values that we plot in
Fig. 3 for per capita public debt. For all periods ∆t and
initial years analyzed, we find values of S > 1 indicating
divergence.
A natural question is – how does the per capita debt
di vary across all countries and by income group? Power
law probability density functions (pdf) have been ob-
served for total country GDP [17] and per capita GDP
[18]. Fig. 5 shows the pdf P (d) for all countries an-
alyzed over the 36-year period 1970-2005. We observe
large variations across income groups, where low income
countries typically have relatively small per capita debt
values reflecting their small per capita borrowing capac-
ity. In contrast to the zipf-rank curves for GDP with
ζGDP ≈ 1 corresponding to pdf scaling exponent expo-
nent 1 + 1/ζGDP ≈ 2[17], we observe in Fig. 5(inset) a
scaling value ζd ≈ 0.3 corresponding to a relatively large
pdf scaling exponent 1 + 1/ζd ≈ 4.3.
In a country where both GDP and debt grow with
time, one must analyze the dynamics of both debt and
GDP. Since a debt that is large for Luxembourg is not
large for the U.S., various indices have been proposed
in order to compare the burden of debt to the ability of
the country’s economy to generate income. These include
R[19, 20], so we apply the convergence analysis of Eq. (4)
to R(t) obtaining
log[Ri(t+∆t)] = α
′ ∆t+ (1− β′∆t) log[Ri(t)] . (5)
Fig. 2 compares R(t) over (b) 15-year and (e) 7-year
time horizons. Fig. 7 shows S′ ≡ (1 − β′∆t) < 1, im-
plying convergence β′ > 0, over a large range of ∆t-year
horizons for initial year t.
A responsible government is expected to monitor si-
multaneously the growth of debt and GDP [21]. By bor-
rowing money, a country may increase R(t) for some
time, but clearly R(t) cannot increase indefinitely, as
increased debt can negatively affect GDP growth [22].
Banks prefer individuals with large incomes and small
debts. Banks also prefer countries that have, for a given
GDP level, small relative debt. Fig. 1 provides the an-
nual trend of R(t) for several groups of countries with
common geo-politial backgrounds.
Debtor default risk is estimated by many rating agen-
cies and financial organizations. R(t) is an important
quantity for determining the ability of a debtor to make
debt payments. For large R(t) there is a larger proba-
bility that the debtor will not be able to make timely
payments or be able to prevent further debt increase
with time, scenarios that lead to credit default. In or-
der to quantify the risky debt levels, we collect the R(t)
values of all countries analyzed over the 36-year period
1970-2005 and plot the pdf P (R) in Fig. 8. We find
< R >= 0.57± 0.54, and we fit the pdf to a Gamma dis-
3tribution P (R) ∝ Rk−1 exp[−R/Rc] with k = 2.0 ± 0.1
and Rc = 0.30± 0.01, using the maximum likelihood es-
timator. The extreme value statistics of Gamma pdf can
be used to define thresholds for sustainable debt.
In order to analyze the countries that have large R(t)
and a high risk of default, the countries which consti-
tute the pdf tail, we plot rank-frequency curves in Fig.
8(inset). The Zipf plots show a power law over three
orders of magnitude, with scaling exponent ζR ≈ 0.4
corresponding to P (R) ∼ R−3.5.
III. MODEL
Our analysis, performed across a wide cross section of
countries, confirms the existence of convergence in public
debt. This is opposite of what is in GDP data [11–13],
where the speed of convergence β is negative. We now
discuss how to model the scaling result we obtain, and
how to use the scaling result obtained for GDP and public
debt. Figs. 2(c) and 2(f) compare the per capita debt
to per capita GDP for the years 1990 and 2005. The
typical relationship between debt and GDP shows a scale
invariant form,
g ∼ A dγ , (6)
where g is the per capita GDP and d is the per capita
debt. In Fig. 7 we plot the values of γ for the set of
countries analyzed in each yearly data set.
In order to model debt dynamics, we assume that the
functional dependence in Eq. (6) is time invariant. Note
that if g(t) and d(t) grow exponentially with different
growth rates, rg and rd, the relationship between g(t)
and d(t) still has the form of a power law, with rg = γ rd.
We may consider the dynamics of public debt by as-
suming that the government borrows B(t), a fixed pro-
portion of GDP given by B(t) ≡ D(t) − D(t − 1) ≡
∆D(t) = b G(t), with deficit ratio b = constant [23].
Then rD ≡ ∆D/D = b G(t)/D(t), and
rd = b g(t)/d(t)− rpop = bN/d(t)
1−γ
− rpop , (7)
where rpop denotes the population growth rate [20].
Hence,
∂rd
∂d
=
−bN(1− γ)
d2−γ
∝ 1/d2−γ . (8)
We observe from Fig. 7 that γ . 1 so that ∂rd/∂d ≃
−1/d. For this reason, we use the regression rd ∼= α −
β log[di(t)], which agrees well with the data in Figs. (2)
and (3).
IV. DISCUSSION
In summary, we demonstrate convergence in per capita
public debt across a wide set of countries during the pe-
riod 1970-2005, a result of general interest for complex
systems researchers as well as for creditors. Our anal-
ysis is made possible by new comprehensive data sets,
and extends empirical surveys previously performed on
country GDP which found divergence in country GDP.
While divergence in country GDP implies that economic
wealth is moving away from global equality, convergence
in per capita debt implies that indebtedness is becoming
an economic standard. Furthermore, convergence in the
R implies that relative differences in indebtedness across
countries is also decreasing over time. Some economists
believe that convergence across all countries is possible
through globalization [17, 24–26] and access to open mar-
kets [27]. While public debt can be used to invest in a
country’s development via physical infrastructure, tech-
nology, and social programs, its use requires responsible
governance. Corruption[28, 29] and the misuse of pub-
lic debt can lead to insurmountable debt contributing
to financial crisis, which can cause further increase in
debt levels through exchange rate depreciation [30, 31].
There are also instances of extremely poor debtor na-
tions that are unable to meet their current and future
debt obligations (See Fig. 1). Recent programs such as
the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative,
sponsored by the World Bank and the IMF, and the Ju-
bilee 2000 Campaign-to-Drop-the-Dept, have called on
debt cancellation for extremely poor debtor nations as a
crucial step in the UN Millennium Project to eliminate
extreme poverty [32–34]. Further, debt has become a
problem for not only the extremely poor countries. With
the current global credit crunch, their is an increased
need for responsible use of government debt.
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FIG. 1: Illustration of debt-to-GDP ratio R(t) for (a-d) several countries and (e) the average trend for three subsets according
to World Bank Income Group (IG) classifications. (a) Countries with turmoil, as in the case of Israel and Sudan which
experienced periods of war, and Guyana which formed a new government, can experience periods of extremely high R. (b)
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(f) Mediterranian countries with recent concern of default risk.
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